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Washington’s Growth Management Act (GMA) and Shoreline Man-
agement Act (SMA) require cities and counties to adopt and regularly up-
date regulations that protect against further degradation of the natural en-
vironment resulting from development.1 Although neither statute requires 
any one method for achieving that directive, most jurisdictions carry out 
                                                 
1See Wash. Rev Code § 36.70A.030(5) (defining critical areas); Wash. Rev. Code § 
36.70A.060(2) (requiring each county and city planning under the GMA to adopt development regu-
lations that protect critical areas); Wash. Rev Code § 36.70A.172(1) (requiring designation and pro-
tection of critical areas to include best available science); Wash. Rev. Code § 90.58.020 (requiring 
local governments to manage shorelines with an emphasis on the preservation of “fragile” shoreline, 
“natural resources,” “the land and its vegetation and wildlife,” “the waters and their aquatic life,” 
“ecology,” and “environment,” among other goals). See generally Richard L. Settle, The Growth Man-
agement Revolution in Washington: Past, Present, and Future, 16 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 867 (1993) 
(giving a history of the GMA and detailed discussion of the Act’s various requirements); Eric S. 
Laschever, An Overview of Washington’s Growth Management Act, 7 Pac. Rim L. & Pol’y J. 657 
(1998); Alan D. Copsey, Including Best Available Science in the Designation and Protection of Crit-
ical Areas Under the Growth Management Act, 23 Seattle U. L. Rev. 97 (1999); Geoffrey Crooks, The 
Washington Shoreline Management Act of 1971, 49 Wash. L. Rev. 423, 423-24 (1974) (giving a his-
tory of the SMA). 
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this mandate by requiring that owners of property adjacent to sensitive ar-
eas, like streams or shorelines, dedicate a “critical area buffer” as a man-
datory condition on any new permit approval.2 Despite the ubiquity of crit-
ical area buffer provisions, a government demand that a landowner dedi-
cate a strip of private property as a conservation area must still comply 
with the Takings Clauses of the U.S. and Washington Constitutions.3  
Typically, a land-use permit condition demanding that a landowner 
dedicate his or her property to the public’s benefit must satisfy the doctrine 
of unconstitutional conditions as set out by the U.S. Supreme Court in Nol-
lan v. California Coastal Commission4 and Dolan v. City of Tigard.5 To-
gether, those cases established the “essential nexus” and “rough propor-
tionality” tests, which hold that the government may only require a land-
owner to dedicate property where the dedication is necessary to mitigate 
the negative impacts of the proposed development on the public.6 A con-
dition that satisfies the nexus and proportionality requirements is consid-
ered a proper exercise of the government’s land-use authority.7 However, 
a condition indirectly takes property when it demands property in excess 
of what is necessary to mitigate adverse impacts of a proposed develop-
ment.8 Thus, the permit condition violates the doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions.9 
The U.S. Supreme Court has readily applied this doctrine to condi-
tions demanding the dedication of stream and wetland buffers.10 Washing-
ton’s appellate courts, however, are split on whether the heightened scru-
tiny demanded by Nollan and Dolan apply to the same type of buffer con-
ditions. In early decisions, Washington closely followed Nollan and Do-
lan, holding that generally applicable land use regulations that demand that 
                                                 
2 A “critical area buffer” is a strip of land contiguous to a sensitive area that is vegetated with 
native trees and shrubs and where no land use activities are allowed. Swinomish Indian Tribal Cmty. 
v. W. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd.,161 Wash.2d 415, 430-31 (2007); see also Thomas Hurby, 
Update on Wetland Buffers: State of the Science, Publication Number 13-06-011, Wash. Dep’t of 
Ecology (2013). 
3 Wash. Const. art. I, § 16; U.S. Const. amend. V. 
4 Nollan v. California Coastal Commission 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
5 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
6 Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2594-95, 186 L. Ed. 2d 697 
(2013); see also Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385 (“[G]overnment may not require a person to give up the 
constitutional right . . . to receive just compensation when property is taken for a public use—in ex-
change for a discretionary benefit [that] has little or no relationship to the property”).   
7 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2594-95. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 In Dolan, the Court invalidated the government’s demand that a landowner dedicate a stream 
buffer. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 393-94. And in Koontz, the Court held a fee imposed in lieu of a conserva-
tion easement was subject to the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2592. 
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owners dedicate a buffer as a condition of permit approval must satisfy the 
nexus and proportionality tests.11   
But in recent decisions, the courts of appeals has held laws imposing 
critical area buffer conditions exempt from the nexus and proportionality 
tests.12 Those cases hold that a buffer dedication automatically satisfies the 
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions if the city or county relied on sci-
ence to show that the demanded dedication may provide environmental 
benefits to the public.13 Despite this deep and irreconcilable split of au-
thority, Washington’s Supreme Court has declined review in each and 
every case involving an unconstitutional conditions challenge to a critical 
area buffer.14 As it stands today, Washington’s body of unconstitutional 
conditions case law is comprised of incoherent and contradictory appellate 
decisions, many of which are in direct conflict with the very federal prec-
edents they purport to apply.15 
The conclusion that buffers should not be subject to heightened scru-
tiny is predicated on two arguments, neither of which has any merit under 
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. Most commonly, buffer pro-
ponents claim that Nollan and Dolan only apply in the limited context of 
                                                 
11 See Kitsap All. of Prop. Owners v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd. (KAPO), 
160 Wash.App 250, 273, 255 P.3d 696 (2011) (Holding that a critical area buffer imposed as a man-
datory condition on a development permit “must comply with the nexus and rough proportionality 
tests.”); Honesty in Envtl. Analysis Legislation v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd. 
(HEAL), 96 Wash.App 522, 533, 979 P.2d 864 (1999) (Critical area buffers “must comply with nexus 
and rough proportionality limits the United States Supreme Court has placed on governmental author-
ity to impose conditions on development applications.”); see also Citizens’ All. for Prop. Rights v. 
Sims, 145 Wash.App 649, 661, 187 P.3d 786 (2008) (Applying Nollan and Dolan through a state 
statute, the court held that a code provision that prohibited rural property owners from clearing vege-
tation retention areas as a condition of permit approval constituted a dedication and was subject to 
nexus and proportionality requirements). 
12 See, e.g., KAPO, 160 Wash.App at 273-74. 
13Id. 
14 See Common Sense All. v. San Juan Cty., 184 Wash. 2d 1038, 380 P.3d 406 (2016); Olympic 
Stewardship Found. v. W. Washington Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 174 Wash. 2d 1007, 278 P.3d 
1112 (2012) (denying review); Kitsap All. of Prop. Owners v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hear-
ings Bd., 171 Wash. 2d 1030, 257 P.3d 662 (2011) (denying review); Citizens' All. for Prop. Rights v. 
Sims, 165 Wash. 2d 1030, 203 P.3d 378 (2009) (denying review). 
15 It is no secret that Washington’s regulatory takings law is in dire need of comprehensive re-
form. For years, legal scholars from both the public and private sectors have repeatedly noted that state 
takings law is “mired in a cumbersome, confusing, and constitutionally suspect takings analysis.” 
Roger D. Wynne, The Path Out of Washington’s Takings Quagmire: The Case for Adopting the Fed-
eral Takings Analysis, 86 Wash. L. Rev. 125, 128 (2011); see also P. Dayton and L. Clark, Lingle 
Lingering: Seven Years after the United States Supreme Court's Lingle v. Chevron USA, Inc., Wash-
ington Courts Have Not Reformed the State's Regulatory Takings Test, 39 Envtl. & Land Use Law 
(WSBA, May 2012); see also John M. Groen & Richard M. Stephens, Takings Law, Lucas, and the 
Growth Management Act, 16 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 1259, 1293 (1993); Jill M. Teutsch, Comment, 
Taking Issue with Takings: Has the Washington State Supreme Court Gone Too Far?, 66 Wash. L. 
Rev. 545 (1991); Richard L. Settle, Regulatory Taking Doctrine in Washington: Now You See It, Now 
You Don't, 12 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 339 (1989). 
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an adjudicative permit condition—conditions mandated by an act of gen-
eral legislation, such as critical areas ordinances that impose buffer condi-
tions on all properties in a predetermined and preset manner, should be 
exempt from heightened scrutiny.16 That argument, however, is readily 
dismissed by looking to the historical development and application of the 
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions—there is simply no basis in the 
doctrine itself for distinguishing between the particular branch of govern-
ment that is making the unconstitutional demand.   
In the alternative, buffer proponents argue that a government demand 
that landowners set aside a portion of his or her land as a conservation area 
does not take a protected interest in real property.17 Therefore, they argue 
that, even if Nollan and Dolan apply to legislatively mandated conditions, 
a buffer condition does not implicate any of the protections guaranteed by 
the Takings Clause and is not subject to the doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions.18 That argument, however, fails to acknowledge a large body 
of case law recognizing that a law demanding that private property be pre-
served as a conservation area forces that land into public environmental 
use and must comply with the Takings Clause. 
This article will consider the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions 
with particular regard to the doctrine’s applicability to buffer conditions 
imposed pursuant to acts of general legislation. Part II provides an over-
view and analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court’s unconstitutional conditions 
case law. Part III discusses the state of Washington’s unconstitutional con-
ditions case law. Part IV argues that a critical area buffer on private prop-
erty constitutes a valuable and protected property right. Part V asks 
whether the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. 
Inc.,19 and Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist.,20 compels changes 
to Washington’s case law. In light of those cases, the article considers 
whether there is any meaningful purpose for distinguishing so-called “leg-
islative” exactions from those conditions that are imposed as part of an 
adjudicative procedure under the Takings Clause. Part V concludes that 
there is no special environmental exception to the law of takings. Public 
burdens, including the cost of environmental regulation, may not be placed 
on an individual property owner. Instead, such burdens must be borne by 
the public as a whole, as the framers of the Constitution intended.21   
                                                 
16 See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Eustis, Square Pegs in Round Holes: The Washington Courts' Misappli-
cation of Federal Regulatory Takings Law, 4 Seattle J. Envtl. L. 1, at 20-22 (2014). 
17 Id. at 22. 
18 See id. at 22-24. 
19 Lingle v. Chevron, 544 U.S. 528, 542-43 (2005). 
20 133 S. Ct. 2586. 
21 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
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II. THE DOCTRINE OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS AND ITS 
SPECIAL APPLICATION TO LAND-USE EXACTIONS 
Over the years, the Washington Supreme Court has repeatedly held 
that decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court interpreting the Fifth Amend-
ment of the U.S. Constitution “set[] a minimum floor of protection, below 
which state law may not go.”22 Thus, although the State’s high court has 
yet to explicitly recognize the doctrine’s application to property rights,23 
the most appropriate starting point for this analysis is the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s unconstitutional conditions case law.   
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions finds its roots in a series 
of mid-Nineteenth century cases responding to a wave of protectionist 
state laws that had placed unconstitutional conditions—such as a waiver 
of the right to remove lawsuits to federal court—on foreign companies 
seeking permission to do business in the state.24 As originally expressed 
by the U.S. Supreme Court, the doctrine was  structural in nature, strictly 
enforcing an outer limit on government authority to demand that citizens 
waive a constitutionally protected right in exchange for a government ben-
efit. The doctrine recognizes that, on the one hand, the sovereign generally 
enjoys broad power to attach conditions to its provision of a gratuity or 
bounty to an individual.25 On the other hand, that authority ends when the 
government conditions the provision of a discretionary benefit upon a re-
quirement that a person waive or surrender up a constitutionally protected 
right.26 In other words, the doctrine holds that the government may not do 
indirectly that which it could not constitutionally accomplish directly: 
“[T]he power of the state […] is not unlimited; and one of the limita-
tions is that it may not impose conditions which require relinquish-
ment of constitutional rights.  […]  It is inconceivable that guarantees 
embedded in the Constitution of the United States may thus be ma-
nipulated out of existence.27 
                                                 
22 Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 652, 747 P.2d 1062 (1987). 
23 Eustis, Square Pegs, 4 Seattle J. Envtl. L. at 17, n.90 (noting that the Washington Supreme 
Court has yet to recognize the unconstitutional conditions doctrine outside the context of criminal 
sentencing). 
24 See, e.g., Lafayette Ins. Co v. French, 59 U.S., 404, 407 (1855) (“This consent [to do business 
as a foreign corporation] may be accompanied by such condition as Ohio may think fit to impose; … 
provided they are not repugnant to the constitution of laws of the United States.”); see also Doyle v. 
Continental Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535, 543 (1876) (Bradley, J., dissenting) (“Though a State may have the 
power, if it sees fit to subject its citizens to the inconvenience, of prohibiting all foreign corporations 
from transacting business within its jurisdiction, it has no power to impose unconstitutional conditions 
upon their doing so”). 
25 Ivanhoe Irrigation Distr. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 294-95 (1958). 
26 Id. at 295. 
27 Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm’n, 271 U.S. 583, 593-94 (1926); see also Rich-
ard A. Epstein, Bargaining with the State 5 (1993) (The doctrine holds that even if the government has 
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Importantly, the U.S. Supreme Court did not couple the doctrine to 
any single clause of the constitution.28 Over the years, the Court invoked 
the doctrine in defense of rights secured by the Free Speech and Freedom 
of Religion Clauses,29 the Commerce and Due Process Clauses,30 among 
others.31 
 The unique nature of land-use permitting compelled the U.S. Su-
preme Court to devise a “special application of the ‘doctrine of unconsti-
tutional conditions’”32 that is designed to protect a landowner’s rights in 
property33 while at the same time recognizing the government’s authority 
to plan for appropriate community development.34 In lieu of the strict scru-
tiny typically applied in an unconstitutional conditions case, the Court in 
Nollan and Dolan devised the “essential nexus” and “rough proportional-
ity” tests to define the limited circumstances in which the government may 
lawfully condition permit approval upon the dedication of a property in-
terest to the public: (1) the government may require a landowner to dedi-
cate property to a public use only where the dedication is necessary to mit-
igate for the negative impacts of the proposed development on the public; 
and (2) the government may not use the permit process to coerce landown-
ers into giving property to the public that the government would otherwise 
have to pay for.35   
                                                 
absolute discretion to grant or deny any individual a privilege or benefit—such as a land-use permit, 
“it cannot grant the privilege subject to conditions that improperly ‘coerce,’ ‘pressure,’ or ‘induce’ the 
waiver of that person’s constitutional rights.”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 
102 Harv. L. Rev. 1413 (1989); Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1595 (1960). 
28 James Burling & Graham Owen, The Implications of Lingle on Inclusionary Zoning and other 
Legislative and Monetary Exactions, 28 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 397, 407 (2009) (The unconstitutional con-
ditions doctrine has been invoked in a wide range of cases in which “government has traded with 
people for their right to free speech, their right to freedom of religion, their right to be free from 
unreasonable searches, their right to equal protection, and their right to due process of law”). 
29 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Speiser 
v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 529 (1958). 
30 Hanover Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U.S. 494, 514-15 (1926); W. Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 
U.S. 1, 34-48 (1910). 
31 See James S. Burling & Graham Owen, The Implications of Lingle on Inclusionary Zoning 
and other Legislative and Monetary Exactions, 28 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 397, 407 (2009).   
32 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 530. Indeed, outside the context of permit applications, conditions demand-
ing the surrender of private property are subject to strict scrutiny. “For example, a state may not say 
to a foreign corporation, you may do business within our borders if you permit your property to be 
taken without the due process of law[.]”  Baltic Min. Co. v. Mass., 231 U.S. 68 (1913). 
33 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 833 (“[T]he right to build on one’s own property—even though its exercise 
can be subjected to legitimate permitting requirements —cannot remotely be described as a ‘govern-
mental benefit’”). 
34 See Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 187 (1928); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty 
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926). 
35 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2594-96. The heightened scrutiny demanded by Nollan and Dolan is 
essential because landowners “are especially vulnerable to the type of coercion that the unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine prohibits because the government often has broad discretion to deny a permit 
8 Seattle Journal of Environmental Law [Vol. 8:1 
A. The Nexus and Proportionality Tests Protect Against Abuse of 
the Permit System by Requiring that Exactions be Sufficiently Related to 
the Burdened Development to Justify the Property Demand    
A brief overview of the U.S. Supreme Court’s exactions cases illus-
trates how the nexus and proportionality tests are intended to work. In Nol-
lan, the California Coastal Commission, acting pursuant to the require-
ments of state law, required the Nollans to dedicate an easement to allow 
the public to cross over a strip of their private beachfront property as a 
condition of obtaining a permit to rebuild their home.36 The Commission 
specifically justified the condition on the grounds that “the new house 
would increase blockage of the view of the ocean, thus contributing to the 
development of ‘a “wall” of residential structures’ that would prevent the 
public ‘psychologically . . . from realizing a stretch of coastline exists 
nearby that they have every right to visit,’ ” and would “increase private 
use of the shorefront.”37 The Nollans refused to accept the condition and 
brought a federal takings claim against the Commission in state court, ar-
guing that the condition was unconstitutional because it bore no connec-
tion to the impact of their proposed development.38 
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed, holding that the easement condition 
violated the Takings Clause because it lacked an “essential nexus” to the 
alleged public impacts that the Nollans’ project caused.39 Because the Nol-
lans’ home would have no impact on public beach access, the Commission 
could not justify a permit condition requiring them to dedicate an easement 
over their property.40 Without a constitutionally sufficient connection be-
tween a permit condition and a project’s alleged impact, the easement con-
dition was “not a valid regulation of land use but an ‘out-and-out plan of 
extortion.’ ”41   
The Court defined how close a “fit” is required between a permit con-
dition and the alleged impact of a proposed land use several years later in 
Dolan. There, the City conditioned Florence Dolan’s permit to expand her 
plumbing and electrical supply store upon a requirement that she dedicate 
some of her land as a stream buffer and a bicycle path.42 Dolan refused to 
                                                 
that is worth far more than property it would like to take.” see also id. at 2596 (“Extortionate demands 
for property in the land-use permitting context run afoul of the Takings Clause not because they take 
property but because they impermissibly burden the right not to have property taken without just com-
pensation.”). 
36 483 U.S. at 827-28.   
37 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828-29 (quoting Commission).   
38 Id. at 828. 
39 Id. at 837.   
40 Id. at 838-39.   
41 Id. at 837 (citations omitted). 
42 512 U.S. at 377.   
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comply with the conditions and sued the City in state court, alleging that 
the development conditions effected an unlawful taking and should be en-
joined.43 The U.S. Supreme Court initially concluded that the City estab-
lished a nexus between both conditions and Dolan’s proposed expansion, 
but nevertheless held that the conditions were unconstitutional.44 Even 
when a nexus exists, the Court explained, there still must be a “degree of 
connection between the exactions and the projected impact of the proposed 
development.”45 There must be rough proportionality—i.e., “some sort of 
individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in 
nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development.”46 The Do-
lan Court held that the City had not demonstrated that the permit condi-
tions were roughly proportional to the impact of Dolan’s expansion, and 
therefore concluded that the conditions violated the Constitution and were 
void.47   
Importantly, both Nollan and Dolan involved demands for land that 
the government had targeted for acquisition and public use before the own-
ers submitted their land-use applications and without regard to the actual 
impacts of the development proposal.48 The Court determined that height-
ened scrutiny was especially necessary to distinguish a superficial rela-
tionship from one that warrants a compelled and uncompensated dedica-
tion of land, and to safeguard against extortionate permit conditions.49  
B. The U.S. Supreme Court Distinguishes the Unconstitutional Con-
ditions Doctrine from General Regulatory Takings Claims  
Critical to understanding the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions 
is the fact that, while Nollan and Dolan are predicated on a violation of the 
Takings Clause, the doctrine is distinct from a regulatory takings test. In 
the decades following Nollan and Dolan, there was substantial confusion 
about how and where the nexus and proportionality tests applied. This con-
fusion was exacerbated by two factors. First, although the doctrine has a 
lengthy pedigree with the U.S. Supreme Court, it remained relatively ob-
scure.50 And second, the decisions in Nollan and Dolan had originally 
                                                 
43 Id. at 382. 
44 Id. at 394-95. 
45 Id. at 386.   
46 Id. at 391.   
47 Id. 
48 Mark W. Cordes, Legal Limits on Development Exactions: Responding to Nollan and Dolan, 
15 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 513, 551 (1995). 
49 Id. 
50 In part, the doctrine’s obscurity was due to the fact that many of the seminal cases do not 
mention the doctrine by name. See, e.g., Michael Toth, Out of Balance: Wrong Turns in Public Em-
ployee Speech Law, 10 U. Mass. L. Rev. 346, 384 (2015). 
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adopted a third prong to the test, holding that a permit condition must also 
“substantially advance” a legitimate government purpose to be valid.51 As 
authority for that prong, the Court cited the now-overruled case, Agins v. 
City of Tiburon, 52 which concerned a facial regulatory takings challenge 
to the city’s adoption of certain zoning ordinances rather than a permit 
condition.53 Thus, before the Court eventually clarified the doctrine of un-
constitutional conditions, many courts, including Washington’s, read Nol-
lan and Dolan as establishing a test applicable to any land use regulation 
that diminishes the value of private property.54  
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed that erroneous application of the 
nexus and proportionality tests in two cases decided in 1999 and 2005. In 
City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.,55 a property owner 
had submitted a series of applications for a permit to build a multi-family 
residential complex on a coastal property zoned for such use.56 The city 
delayed and denied every permit application for a variety of reasons, and 
the landowner sued alleging two different regulatory takings theories: (1) 
the reasons provided for the permit denial lacked a sufficient nexus to the 
government’s stated objectives under Nollan; and (2) the permit denial de-
prived the property owner of all economically viable use under Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).57 The jury deliv-
ered a general verdict concluding that the government’s actions effected a 
temporary regulatory takings, and awarded compensation.58   
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the verdict, 
concluding that there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the 
jury’s verdict on either regulatory takings theory.59 In doing so, however, 
the Ninth Circuit posited that the evidence could have also established a 
violation of Dolan’s rough proportionality test.60 The U.S. Supreme Court 
granted certiorari, in part, to determine whether the Ninth Circuit “erred in 
assuming that the rough-proportionality standard of [Dolan] applied to this 
case.”61 Ultimately, however, the Court unanimously affirmed the court of 
appeals’ judgment on different grounds, stating that it was unnecessary to 
discuss Dolan where substantial evidence had demonstrated that the city’s 
                                                 
51 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831; Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385. 
52 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). 
53 Id. at 260. 
54 See, e.g., Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash.2d 621, 642-43, 653, 655 (1987). 
55 City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687 (1999). 
56 Id. at 695-98.   
57 Id. at 700-01.   
58 Id.   
59 Id. at 701-02 (citing Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monterey, 95 F.3d 1422, 
1430-34 (9th Cir. 1996)).   
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 702.   
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decision to deny the permit lacked a sufficient nexus to the government’s 
stated objectives.62 
The Del Monte Dunes Court explained that, although the lower court 
had not provided “a definitive statement of the elements of a claim for a 
temporary regulatory taking” the trial court’s jury instructions were suffi-
ciently consistent with the Supreme Court’s previous regulatory takings 
decisions to establish the city’s liability.63 As a result, the Court declined 
to rule on the question whether Dolan applied to a permit denial, holding 
only that “it was unnecessary for the Court of Appeals to discuss rough 
proportionality. That it did so is irrelevant to our disposition of the case.”64 
Nonetheless, writing in dicta, the Supreme Court noted that it had “not 
extended the rough-proportionality test of Dolan beyond the special con-
text of exactions-land-use decisions conditioning approval of development 
on the dedication of property to public use.”65 Although that discussion 
shed some much-needed light on the doctrine’s application to permit con-
ditions, it also resulted in more confusion that will be discussed below. 
The Court revisited Nollan and Dolan several years later in Lingle v. 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc.66  There, Chevron sued the State of Hawaii alleging 
that the price cap provisions of legislation designed to lessen the oil com-
pany’s share of the state’s gasoline station market constituted a regulatory 
taking.67  The trial court agreed, and granted summary judgment in favor 
of Chevron, concluding under Agins that the statute failed to substantially 
advance a legitimate public interest.68 On review, the U.S. Supreme Court 
concluded that the “substantially advances a legitimate government inter-
est” test was properly categorized as a due process test, not a regulatory 
takings test, because it “reveal[ed] nothing about the magnitude or charac-
ter of the burden a particular regulation imposes upon private property 
rights.”69 It explained that a “test that tells us nothing about the actual bur-
den imposed on property rights, or how that burden is allocated, cannot 
                                                 
62 The decision speaks to both Nollan’s nexus requirement and the now-excised requirement that 
the decision substantially advance a legitimate government interest. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 
701.  
63 The jury was instructed that “if the preponderance of the evidence establishes that there was 
no reasonable relationship between the city’s denial of the ... proposal and legitimate public purpose, 
you should find in favor of the plaintiff.”  Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 701; Id. at 703 (citing Dolan, 
512 U.S. at 385; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016; Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 534 (1992); Nollan, 483 
U.S. at 834; Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenebrictus, 480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987); United 
States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 126 (1985);, 447 U.S. at 260 ). 
64 Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 703 (Dolan was designed to address the problem of “excessive 
exactions”).  
65 Id. at 702. 
66 544 U.S. 528, 538-39 (2005). 
67 Id. at 532-34. 
68 Id. at 535-36. 
69 Id. at 542.   
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tell us when justice might require that the burden be spread among taxpay-
ers through payment of compensation.”70   
The Court made clear that its decision to excise the “substantially 
advances” inquiry from the takings lexicon did not affect the viability of 
an exactions claim brought under Nollan and Dolan.71 In reaffirming the 
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, the Court explained that the nexus 
and proportionality tests are “worlds apart from a rule that says a regula-
tion affecting property constitutes a taking on its face solely because it 
does not substantially advance a legitimate government interest.”72 
Like Del Monte Dunes, however, the Court’s attempt to explain the 
unique nature of a case brought under Nollan and Dolan only added to 
existing confusion about the doctrine’s applicability. Many courts and 
practitioners read Del Monte Dunes and Lingle as having limited the nexus 
and proportionality tests to the facts of Nollan and Dolan, applying to only 
those adjudicatively imposed permit conditions that require a dedication 
of real property to the public.73 By the time the U.S. Supreme Court revis-
ited the doctrine in 2013, there was a deeply entrenched and nationwide 
split of authority on the question of whether Nollan and Dolan also applied 
to legislatively mandated conditions or to permit conditions that demand 
money (or other personal property) in lieu of a property dedication.74   
                                                 
70 Id. at 543.   
71 Id. at 547-48. 
72 Id. at 547-48. 
73 The Supreme Courts of Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, and Colorado, and the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, limit Nollan and Dolan to administratively imposed conditions. See, e.g., 
Alto Eldorado Partners v. City of Santa Fe, 634 F.3d 1170, 1179 (10th Cir. 2011); St. Clair Cnty. 
Home Builders Ass’n v. City of Pell City, 61 So. 3d 992, 1007 (Ala. 2010); Spinell Homes, Inc. v. 
Municipality of Anchorage, 78 P.3d 692, 702 (Alaska 2003); San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City & Cty of 
San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 102-04 (Cal. 2002); Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation Dist., 19 P.3d 687, 
696 (Colo. 2001); Home Builders Ass’n of Cent. Arizona v. Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993, 996 (Ariz. 1997), 
cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1120 (1997). 
74 The Texas, Ohio, Maine, Illinois, New York, and Washington Supreme Courts and the First 
Circuit Court of Appeals do not distinguish between legislatively and administratively imposed exac-
tions, and apply the nexus and proportionality tests to generally applicable permit conditions. Town of 
Flower Mound, 135 S.W.3d at 641; Home Builders Ass’n of Dayton & Miami Valley v. City of Bea-
vercreek, 729 N.E.2d 349, 355-56 (Ohio 2000); Curtis v. Town of South Thomaston, 708 A.2d 657, 
660 (Maine 1998); City of Portsmouth v. Schlesinger, 57 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1995); Northern Ill. 
Home Builders Ass’n, Inc. v. Cty of Du Page, 649 N.E.2d 384, 397 (Ill. 1995); Manocherian v. Lenox 
Hill Hosp., 643 N.E.2d 479, 483 (N.Y. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1109 (1994); Trimen Dev. Co. v. 
King Cty., 877 P.2d 187, 194 (Wash. 1994). Meanwhile, the Ninth Circuit is internally conflicted on 
this question. See Mead v. City of Cotati, 389 Fed. App’x 637, 639 (9th Cir. 2010) (Nollan and Dolan 
do not apply to legislative conditions); Commercial Builders of N. Cal. v. City of Sacramento, 941 
F.2d 872, 874-76 (9th Cir. 1991) (adjudicating a Nollan-based claim against an ordinance requiring 
developers to provide affordable housing); Garneau v. City of Seattle, 147 F.3d 802, 813-15, 819-20 
(9th Cir. 1998) (plurality opinion with the court divided equally on whether Nollan and Dolan apply 
to legislative exactions). 
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C. The U.S. Supreme Court Clarifies the Doctrine and its Applica-
bility to Land-Use Permit Conditions in Koontz  
The U.S. Supreme Court revisited the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine in its 2013 decision, Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management 
District.75  There, Coy Koontz, Sr., sought permission to develop a small 
portion of his 14.9 acre undeveloped, commercial property located at the 
intersection of two major highways in Orlando.76  The St. Johns River Wa-
ter Management District (“the District”), a Florida land-use agency, had 
designated his property a critical wetland and demanded that, in addition 
to dedicating 11 acres of his land in a conservation easement, Mr. Koontz 
pay upwards of $150,000 to improve 50 acres of state-owned property 
miles away from his proposed development as a mandatory condition of 
receiving his permits.77  When Mr. Koontz objected that the off-site miti-
gation demand was excessive, the agency denied his permits, rendering his 
property unusable.78 
Mr. Koontz filed a lawsuit in Florida state court, challenging the 
agency’s off-site mitigation demand under Nollan and Dolan, which, if 
faithfully applied, should have provided an easy solution for Mr. Koontz. 
But, over the years, many lower courts had limited Nollan and Dolan to 
their facts, providing ways for local land use authorities to avoid the nexus 
and proportionality requirements.79  For example, instead of demanding an 
interest in real property, agencies began imposing monetary obligations—
i.e., requirements that property owners pay a fee in lieu of the desired prop-
erty dedication as a condition of obtaining a land-use permit.80  Because 
                                                 
75  133 S. Ct. 2586. 
76 Zoned for commercial use, the property is located in an area of intense residential and com-
mercial development adjacent to State Road 50, a major arterial, and immediately east of Florida’s 
East-West Expressway (S.R. 408). A drainage ditch that channels storm water runoff from the highway 
runs along the property’s western edge. And an easement for high-voltage power lines is located about 
300 feet south of the highway, bisecting the lot into northern and southern segments. Koontz, 133 S. 
Ct. at 2591-92.   
77 Florida’s inclusion of portions of Mr. Koontz’s land in the Riparian Habitat Protection Zone 
did not mean the land contained wetlands and/or riparian habitat. Instead, the designation created a 
legal presumption that any use of land within the zone would be harmful to such habitat, therefore 
requiring affected landowners to obtain environmental permits from the District. See Fla. Admin. Code 
r. 40C-4.301(2)(a)7; Fla. Admin. Code  r. 40C-4.301(1), (2); Fla. Admin. Code r. 40C-41.063(5)(d)1, 
4. 
78 133 S. Ct. at 2593. 
79 See Richard Epstein, Introduction: The Harms and Benefits of Nollan and Dolan, 15 N. Ill. U. 
L. Rev. 477, 492 (1995) (The lower courts “worked a pretty thorough nullification of Nollan, which 
was dutifully confined to its particular facts”). 
80 Id. (“One of the reasons for Dolan was the hostile response in the lower courts to Nollan. 
Everywhere you looked the state satisfied the essential nexus test. The lower courts worked a pretty 
thorough nullification of Nollan, which was dutifully confined to its particular facts.”); Steven J. 
Lemon & Sandy R.Colin, The First Applications of the Nollan Nexus Test: Observations and Com-
ments, 13 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 585, 598-600 (1989); Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 Colum. L. 
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Nollan and Dolan involved interests in real property, and not monetary 
obligations, numerous courts held that the government did not have to 
demonstrate nexus and rough proportionality when exacting money or 
other non-real property from land-use applicants.81 Thus, at the time Mr. 
Koontz’s case was winding its way through the courts, there was a signif-
icant split of authority on whether or not the Takings Clause protects a 
person’s money to the same degree that it protects a person’s land.82 
The Florida trial and appellate courts concluded that the District’s 
permit condition was subject to Nollan and Dolan, and found the demand 
for 50 acres of off-site mitigation to be unconstitutional because it lacked 
the necessary connection to any impacts of the development.83 The Florida 
Supreme Court disagreed and reversed the lower court decisions, stating: 
[W]e hold that under the takings clauses of the United States and 
Florida Constitutions, the Nollan/Dolan rule with regard to “essential 
nexus” and “rough proportionality” is applicable only where the con-
dition/exaction sought by the government involves a dedication of or 
over the owner’s interest in real property in exchange for permit ap-
proval; and only when the regulatory agency actually issues the per-
mit sought, thereby rendering the owner’s interest in the real property 
subject to the dedication imposed.84  
The U.S. Supreme Court took review of the case in order to settle the 
federal constitutional questions that had been addressed by the Florida 
courts.85   
Most of the parties’ arguments were focused on how to best charac-
terize the nexus and rough proportionality tests amongst the Supreme 
Court’s case law, and explaining how the character of the tests impacts the 
parties’ substantive and procedural rights. Mr. Koontz argued that the Dis-
trict’s demand that he finance improvements to the government’s property 
                                                 
Rev. 1600, 1608 (1988) (limiting Nollan to only permit conditions involving physical invasions of 
property).   
81 See, e.g., West Linn Corp. Park, LLC v. City of West Linn, 428 Fed. Appx. 700 (9th Cir. 2011); 
West Linn Corp. Park, LLC v. City of West Linn, 240 P.3d 29, 45 (Or. 2010); McClung v. City of 
Sumner, 548 F.3d 1219, 1224 (9th Cir. 2008). 
82 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2594; see also Catherine L. Hall, Valid Regulation of Land Use or Out-
and-out Plan of Extortion? Commentary on St. Johns River Water Management Dist., 41 Real Est. 
L.J. 270, 291 (2012) (“A survey of state and federal decisions reveals there is considerable disagree-
ment about when the application of Nollan and Dolan apply to the exactions takings analysis. . . . The 
Florida Supreme Court and other courts have issued conflicting opinions about whether impact fees 
and off-site mitigation should be subject to scrutiny under this doctrine.”); Robert Meltz, Takings Law 
Today: A Primer for the Perplexed, 34 Ecology L.Q. 307, 369 (2007) (describing split in courts’ in-
terpretation).   
83St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Distr. v. Koontz, 5 So.3d 8, 10-12 (Fla. Ct. App. 2009). 
84 St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Distr. v. Koontz, 77 So.3d 1220, 1230 (Fla. 2011). 
85 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2594. 
2018] Are Critical Area Buffers Unconstitutional? 15 
as a condition of permit approval was an exaction implicating his property 
rights in his money and, therefore, triggering review under the unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine.86 The District, however, argued that because 
Mr. Koontz had objected to the condition, no permit was issued and, there-
fore, there was no taking.87 
As for the Florida Supreme Court’s conclusion that monetary exac-
tions are not subject to the same scrutiny as demands for real property, Mr. 
Koontz contended that nothing in the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, 
the Takings Clause, Nollan, or Dolan recognizes a relevant distinction 
among the types of permit exaction subject to the nexus and rough propor-
tionality limitations.88  Government demands for real or personal prop-
erty—both categories of property protected by the Takings Clause—are 
subject to the same limitations.89   
Moreover, Mr. Koontz argued that application of the nexus and pro-
portionality limitations does not depend upon when in the permit process 
the exaction is imposed.90 A decision to deny a permit application based 
on refusal to accede to an unlawful exaction and a decision to approve a 
permit application subject to acceptance of an unlawful exaction are sub-
stantively identical. In both cases, no permit issues unless and until the 
permit applicant agrees to waive his right to compensation for the confis-
cated property.91 
The District, however, characterized Nollan and Dolan as establish-
ing a regulatory takings test—similar to the argument rejected in Del 
Monte Dunes and Lingle.92  The District then explained that a fundamental 
prerequisite of a regulatory takings claim is that the government has, in 
fact, taken property, either directly or through burdensome regulatory 
measures.93  Because the District denied Mr. Koontz’s permit applications, 
the exaction remained unfulfilled and no taking had, in fact, occurred.94  
Accordingly, the District insisted that its demand, which had formed the 
basis of its permit denial, cannot be subject to heightened scrutiny under 
the nexus and rough proportionality standards.95   
                                                 
86 Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits at 33-39, Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management Dis-
trict, 133 S.Ct. 2586 (2012) (No 11-1447), 2012 WL 5940280. 
87 Brief for Respondent at 26-38, Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, 133 
S.Ct. 2586 (2012) (No 11-1447),.2012 WL 6694053 (U.S.). 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 39-44. 
90 Id. at 30-32. 
91 Id. 
92 Respondent’s Brief on the Merits at 26-28, Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management Dis-
trict, 133 S.Ct. 2586 (2012) (No 11-1447),.2012 WL 6694053. 
93 Id. at 28-30. 
94 Id. at 27-28. 
95 Id. 
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The Court rejected the District’s argument, reaffirming once again 
that the nexus and proportionality tests of Nollan and Dolan constitute “‘a 
special application’ of the [unconstitutional conditions] doctrine that pro-
tects the Fifth Amendment right to just compensation for property that the 
government takes when owners apply for land-use permits.”96 The Court 
explained that the nexus and proportionality tests place a limit on the gov-
ernment’s authority to condition approval of a land use permit upon a ded-
ication of property to a public purpose.97 If a condition satisfies the tests, 
it is constitutional; if not, it is unconstitutional.98 This principle “do[es] not 
change depending on whether the government approves a permit on the 
condition that the applicant turn over property or denies a permit because 
the applicant refuses to do so.”99 Thus, the Court unanimously held “that 
a demand for property from a land-use permit applicant must satisfy the 
requirements of Nollan and Dolan even when the government denies the 
permit[.]”100  
The Court split 5-4 on the question whether a demand for money is 
subject to Nollan and Dolan. The majority ruled that money is property; 
therefore, a permit condition demanding money in lieu of a dedication of 
real property must satisfy nexus and proportionality.101 The dissent, how-
ever, opined that different types of property should be provided differing 
degrees of protection under the Takings Clause.102 Thus, while a demand 
for real property may be properly subject to heightened scrutiny under 
Nollan and Dolan, the dissent suggested that a demand for money should 
be subject to less scrutiny—if any at all.103 The Court ultimately reversed 
and remanded the case for the Florida state courts to enter a decision con-
sistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion and to determine whether 
the District had preserved a series of factual and state-law questions for 
further consideration.104 
                                                 
96 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2599. 
97 Id. at 2595. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. (A “contrary rule would be especially untenable … because it would enable the government 
to evade the limitations of Nollan and Dolan simply by phrasing its demands for property as conditions 
precedent to permit approval. … and would effectively render Nollan and Dolan a dead letter”). 
100Id. at 2603; see also id. at 2603 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“I think the Court gets the first question 
it addresses right”). 
101 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2603. 
102Id.. at 2604-09 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
103 Id. at 2609 n.3. 
104 Id. at 2603. On remand, the Florida Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s conclusion that 
the permit condition violated Nollan and Dolan. The trial court then ordered the state to compensate 
Mr. Koontz for having temporarily taken his property for a period of years during which the District 
had refused—despite a court order—to issue the permit without the unconstitutional condition. See St. 
Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 183 So. 3d 396 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014), rev. denied __ 
So.2d __, 2016 WL 688284 (2016). 
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III. WASHINGTON CASE LAW ON BUFFER CONDITIONS IS RIDDLED 
WITH CONTRADICTORY AND INCOHERENT DECISIONS 
Washington courts are in a state of disarray on the topic of Nollan 
and Dolan. Over the years, state courts have applied the nexus and propor-
tionality tests (1) as a direct regulatory takings theory,105 (2) as a due pro-
cess theory,106 or (3) as incorporated into a state statute limiting local gov-
ernment authority to impose impact fees.107  Unsurprisingly, those courts 
have arrived at very different conclusions about how and where the doc-
trine applies and whether the government must support a demand for a 
critical area buffer with evidence of its necessity. Making matters worse, 
the state appellate courts have split on whether a critical area buffer re-
quirement exacts an interest in real property,108 and more generally, 
whether Nollan and Dolan apply to permit conditions required by an act 
of generally applicable legislation.109 Unless the state Supreme Court re-
solves these conflicts, landowners and the government will be forced to 
plan for future development in an uncertain and unpredictable legal envi-
ronment. 
A. Early Washington Decisions Apply Nollan/Dolan to Permit Con-
ditions Requiring the Dedication of a Conservation Area  
The earliest Washington decisions that considered legislation requir-
ing landowners to dedicate critical area buffers held the conditions subject 
to Nollan and Dolan. In Honesty in Environmental Analysis & Legislation 
v. Central Puget Sound Growth Management Hearings Board (HEAL), the 
court considered amendments to Seattle’s steep slope regulations, which 
the City had adopted as part of its critical areas update.110 The stated pur-
pose of the city’s development restrictions was to prevent further ero-
sion.111 Seattle, however, failed to consider contrary scientific conclusions 
contained in its legislative record, which opined that the City’s prohibition 
against steep slope disturbance would not actually prevent erosion.112 The 
                                                 
105 Sparks v. Douglas Cty., 127 Wash.2d 901, 908 (1995); Burton v. Clark Cty, 91 Wash.App 
505, 530 (1998).   
106 Kitsap All. of Prop. Owners v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 160 
Wash.App 250 (2011).   
107 See Trimen Dev. Co. v. King Cty, 124 Wash. 2d 261 (1994); Citizens’ All. for Property Rights 
v. Sims, 145 Wash.App 649 (2008); Cobb v. Snohomish Cty, 64 Wash.App 451 (1991). 
108 Compare KAPO, 160 Wash.App at 272, with Common Sense All. v. Growth Mgmt Hearings 
Bd, 189 Wash.App 1026, 2015 WL 4730204 at * 7-8 (2015) (unreported). 
109 Id. 
110 HEAL, 96 Wash.App at 535.   
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 529-30. 
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court concluded that the identification of critical areas is a uniquely scien-
tific inquiry that should identify the “nature and extent of [the critical ar-
eas’] susceptibility” to damage that will in fact result from use or develop-
ment of the property.113 As part of its development of a critical areas ordi-
nance, a city must show that its critical area buffers satisfy the nexus and 
proportionality tests. 
. . . . [The City] cannot ignore the best available science in favor of 
the science it prefers simply because the latter supports the decision 
it wants to make. If it does, that decision will violate either the nexus 
or rough proportionality rules or both.114 
Applying the nexus and proportionality standards through a state stat-
ute, Washington courts decided two crucial cases invalidating legisla-
tively-mandated exactions of conservation areas.115 In Isla Verde Interna-
tional Holdings, Inc. v. City of Camas, a property developer sought a per-
mit to build a 51-lot subdivision on 13.4 acres in the City of Camas.116 
Pursuant to a code provision requiring all subdivisions to set aside open 
space, Camas conditioned permit approval upon a requirement that Isla 
Verde set aside 30 percent of its land to provide recreation and environ-
mental benefits.117 The developer challenged the set-aside development 
conditions.118  
Although the court of appeals concluded that the condition violated 
Nollan and Dolan,119 the Washington Supreme Court analyzed the condi-
tion on statutory grounds under the doctrine of avoidance of constitutional 
issues.120 Under the statute’s nexus and proportionality requirement, the 
Court held that the city bore the burden of demonstrating that a dedication 
is “reasonably necessary as a direct result of the proposed development or 
plat.”121 The court emphasized that nexus and proportionality require “that 
development conditions must be tied to a specific, identified impact of a 
                                                 
113 Id. at 533. 
114 Id. at 533-34.   
115 In 1992, the Washington Supreme Court held that the nexus and proportionality tests were 
codified into a state statute that limited local government’s authority to exact impact fees from permit 
applicants in RCW 82.02.020, providing courts with a nonconstitutional basis upon which to evaluate 
exactions. Trimen Dev. Co. v. King Cty, 124 Wash.2d 261, 274 (1994). 
116 Isla Verde Int'l Holdings, Inc. v. City of Camas, 146 Wash.2d 740, 746, 49 P.3d 867 (2002). 
117 Id. at 749-50. 
118 Id. at 750. 
119 Isla Verde Int'l Holdings, Inc. v. City of Camas, 99 Wash.App 127, 139-42, 990 P.2d 429, 
437 (1999), as clarified on denial of reconsideration (Feb. 11, 2000), aff'd on other grounds, 146 
Wash.2d 740, 49 P.3d 867 (2002). 
120 Isla Verde, 146 Wash.2d at 757-58; see also San Telmo Assocs. v. City of Seattle, 108 Wash.2d 
20, 24, 735 P.2d 673 (1987) (shifting general social costs onto developer is an in-kind tax).   
121 Isla Verde, 146 Wash.2d at 761. 
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development on a community.”122 Under this standard, the Court held that 
a city cannot lawfully impose a preset condition applicable to “all new 
development collectively.”123 Accordingly, the Court held that a set-aside 
requirement cannot be “uniformly applied, in the preset amount, regard-
less of the specific needs created by the given development” and invali-
dated the condition.124  
Similarly, in Citizens Alliance for Property Rights v. Sims, a citizen 
group challenged King County’s adoption of a critical areas ordinance that 
required rural property owners to set aside 50 to 65 percent of their land 
as an environmental “resource area” in a uniform and pre-set manner as a 
mandatory condition on all new development.125 Like the condition at is-
sue in Isla Verde, King County’s ordinance did not take into consideration 
whether a proposed rural development would actually cause any increased 
impacts to identified critical areas, and did not take into account whether 
existing regulations or other site-specific management practices could sat-
isfactorily mitigate any impacts of development.126 As a result, the court 
of appeals concluded that King County’s set-aside requirement failed to 
satisfy the proportionality requirement that a condition on development 
must be impact-specific.127 
Between 1992 and 2008, Washington courts, for the most part, faith-
fully applied the nexus and proportionality tests in a manner consistent 
with the U.S. Supreme Court. During this time, Isla Verde and Citizens’ 
Alliance marked the high point in the courts’ willingness to strictly enforce 
the nexus and proportionality requirements against local governments’ use 
of the permit process to exact large tracts of land for public environmental 
purposes.   
B. The Appellate Courts Abandon Nexus and Proportionality Tests 
in Favor of a Substantially Advances Inquiry When Considering Buffer 
Conditions  
 Over the course of three recent decisions, the court of appeals 
abandoned the nexus and proportionality inquiries required by Nollan and 
Dolan in favor of a rational basis test that alleviates the government of 
both heightened scrutiny and the burden of proof. In so doing, the appellate 
courts created significant conflicts, calling into question the doctrine’s ap-
                                                 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 763. 
125 Citizens’ All. for Prop. Rights v. Sims, 145 Wash.App 649, 660–61, 187 P.3d 786 (2008). 
126 Id.  
127 Id. at 668-69. 
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plicability and predictability. Kitsap Alliance of Property Owners v. Cen-
tral Puget Sound Growth Management Hearings Bd. (KAPO),128 a case 
decided shortly after Citizen’s Alliance, set the stage for the current status 
of Washington state takings law. Like Isla Verde and Citizens’ Alliance, 
KAPO involved a citizen lawsuit challenging the county’s adoption of an 
ordinance that required all shoreline property owners to dedicate a shore-
line buffer that was predetermined in size, and was imposed without regard 
to any site-specific conditions.129 The court of appeals, however, reached 
the opposite conclusion as the previous cases, upholding the mandatory 
permit condition.130 
 The KAPO court applied Nollan and Dolan directly to the ordi-
nance, correctly concluding that environmental regulations that impose 
conditions on development applications, like the county’s critical areas or-
dinance, “must comply with the nexus and rough proportionality tests.”131  
But the court then declined to apply nexus and proportionality scrutiny—
as defined by prior state and federal precedent—to the buffer condition.132 
Instead, the court mistakenly characterized Nollan and Dolan as establish-
ing a “due process” doctrine, under which a regulation is subject only to 
rational basis scrutiny.133 Then, applying this lower level of scrutiny, the 
court concluded that Nollan and Dolan would be satisfied if the govern-
ment engaged in a “reasoned process” to determine “the necessity of pro-
tecting functions and values in the critical areas” when adopting CAO 
buffers.134  
 In two decisions issued shortly after KAPO, the appellate courts 
further entrenched the decision to replace the heightened scrutiny de-
manded by Nollan and Dolan with minimal scrutiny. In Olympic Steward-
ship Foundation v. Western Washington Growth Management Hearings 
Board, the court of appeals adopted a per se rule that “any dedications of 
                                                 
128 160 Wash.App 250, 273, 255 P.3d 696 (2011). 
129 Id. at 272-74. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 273. 
132 Id. at 272-74.   
133 Id. at 272. 
134 Id. at 272-74. Of course, the fact that the government developed a scientific record only begs 
the question whether there is any evidence of nexus and proportionality. The idea that a government’s 
reliance on generalized science to determine how much land to put to public use should obviate the 
need for Nollan and Dolan’s factual inquiry turns this Court’s regulatory takings case law on its head. 
Standing alone, a determination of public need has never been sufficient to justify a government’s 
decision to put private property to a public use. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 416 
(“[A] strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving that 
desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change.”). Science is not a talisman 
that precludes judicial scrutiny; instead, it constitutes evidence that should be considered as part of a 
nexus and proportionality analysis.   
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land within the critical areas are de facto ‘reasonably necessary as a direct 
result of the proposed development or plat.’”135  
The most recent appellate decision addressing exactions, Common 
Sense Alliance v. Growth Management Hearings Board,136 marks the fur-
thest retreat from the standards set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court. In 
that case, a group of property owners challenged a county’s adoption of an 
ordinance that required, as a mandatory condition on any new permit ap-
proval, that all shoreline property owners dedicate a significant portion of 
their shorefront as a conservation area designed to filter pollutants from 
stormwater before it reaches the shoreline.137 The final ordinance estab-
lished buffers large enough to filter pollution caused by neighboring land 
uses (including city streets and subpar drainage), doing nothing to limit 
the size of the conservation areas to only that land necessary to mitigate 
for pollution attributable to the effected property owner’s land use.138   
Despite this clear violation of nexus and proportionality, the court of 
appeals rejected CSA’s unconstitutional conditions claim on three 
grounds.139 First, relying on the dicta from Del Monte Dunes, the court 
held that a landowner may not challenge a legislative exaction under the 
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.140 Second, the court misattributed 
Justice Kagan’s dissenting opinion, in which she suggested that legislative 
exaction be subject to lesser scrutiny than adjudicative exactions, to the 
majority opinion, which was silent on the issue.141 And third, relying on 
the dissenting opinion in Koontz (without indicating that the portion of the 
opinion it cited was the dissent), the court held that a landowner may not 
challenge a legislative exaction under the doctrine of unconstitutional con-
ditions.142 Second, citing no authority, the court held that a government 
demand that a property owner dedicate a conservation buffer to a public 
                                                 
135 Olympic Stewardship Found. v. W. Wash Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 166 Wash.App 172, 
199, 274 P.3d 1040 (2012) (applying Nollan and Dolan through the state’s impact fee statute). 
136 Common Sense All. v. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 189 Wash.App 1026, 2015 WL 4730204 
(2015) (unpublished). The court’s analysis of Nollan and Dolan was marred by obvious errors, includ-
ing the incorrect conclusion that Dolan had upheld the challenged stream buffer conditions. Id. at *6. 
The court of appeals refused to correct that patent error on reconsideration, and the State Supreme 
Court denied review. Common Sense All. v. San Juan Cty., 184 Wash. 2d 1038, 380 P.3d 406 (2016). 
137 189 Wash.App. 1026, 2015 WL 4730204 at *1. 
138 See Friends of the San Juans v. San Juan Cty, Western Washington Growth Management 
Hearings Board No. 13-2-0012c, 2013 WL 5212385, at *36 (Final Decision and Oder, Sept. 6, 2013) 
(remanding original buffers and directing the county to increase the buffer size to “take into account 
the intensity of impacts from adjacent land uses”). 
139 189 Wash.App. 1026, 2015 WL 4730204 at *3-8. 
140 Id. at *7 (citing Del Monte Dunes, 526 US at 702.).  
141 Id. at *7 (citing Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2594-96; but see Koontz, 133 S. Ct at 2608 (Kagan, J., 
dissenting)). 
142 Id. 
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environmental use would not qualify as a taking if imposed directly.143 
Third, relying on KAPO’s mischaracterization of Nollan and Dolan as es-
tablishing a due process test, the court held that the buffer demand satisfied 
the minimal scrutiny applicable to a due process challenge.144 Specifically, 
the court concluded that a local government’s reliance on a scientific opin-
ion when developing a mandatory dedication automatically satisfies the 
unconstitutional condition doctrine.145  
Despite the conflict between the KAPO-rational basis line of cases 
and cases relying on the heightened scrutiny standard set out by Nollan, 
Dolan, Lingle, and Koontz—the Washington Supreme Court inexplicably 
declined review in Citizens Alliance, KAPO, OSF, and CSA. The court’s 
failure to timely address this plain conflict of law has allowed a significant 
split of authority regarding the doctrine’s applicability to continue. 
IV. BUFFERS EXACT A VALUABLE INTEREST IN REAL PROPERTY AND 
ARE PROTECTED BY THE TAKINGS CLAUSE 
Until CSA, Washington courts had uniformly held that critical area 
buffers exacted an interest in real property and were, therefore, subject to 
Nollan and Dolan—even though the courts had been anything but con-
sistent in their interpretation and application of the nexus and proportion-
ality tests. CSA is an unsupported outlier that only operates to further con-
fuse landowners and governments alike. Indeed, citing no authority, the 
court ruled “[n]o interest in land will be transferred or conveyed by oper-
ation of the … ordinances” imposing buffers on new development.146 The 
CSA court was simply wrong on that account and must be overturned at 
the earliest opportunity. 
A critical area buffer is a strip of land contiguous to a sensitive area, 
such as a wetland, stream, or shoreline, that is vegetated with native trees 
and shrubs and where no land use activities are allowed.147 The idea behind 
imposing buffers as a regulatory control is two-fold. First, a buffer physi-
cally separates human activity from a sensitive area, leaving the area un-
touched.148 Second, if the vegetated area is large enough and dense 
enough, a buffer can mimic a variety of natural processes that could exist 
                                                 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at *5 (citing KAPO, 160 Wash.App at 273-74).   
145 Id. (“Because the county had considered the best available science and employed a reasoned 
process in adopting its shoreline critical areas ordinance . . . permit decisions . . . based on those 
regulations would satisfy the nexus and rough proportionality tests”). 
146 189 Wash.App 1026, at *8. 
147 Swinomish Indian Tribal Cmty. v. W. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd.,161 Wash.2d 415, 
430, 166 P.3d 1198 (2007). 
148 See A.J. Castelle et al., Wetland and Stream Buffer Size Requirements – A Review, 23 J. En-
viron. Qual. 878, 878 (1994). 
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if the surrounding land remained in an undisturbed state.149 Studies gener-
ally indicate that, based on a variety of site specific factors, a fully vege-
tated buffer can provide a variety of ecological benefits (often referred to 
a “functions”), including impoundment of storm water runoff; filtration of 
sediment, nutrients, and pollutants; and creation of habitat corridors.150  
Because buffers are inexpensive, easy to administrate, and generally 
thought to be effective at addressing such general problems as increasing 
storm water runoff due to urbanization, mandatory buffers have become 
the most common tool employed by government when developing regula-
tions intended to protect environmentally sensitive areas.151   
The manner in which buffers are imposed is also important to under-
stand when evaluating the claim that they do not exact a property interest. 
In a typical case, a parcel of land that is presently used for residential pur-
poses must file a binding site plan and notice to title that designates and 
separates the buffer area from the rest of the lot, as a condition on any 
permit approval.152 These filings operate to sever all development and use 
rights from the buffer zone and are binding on all future owners.153 The 
government retains oversight and control over the buffer zone, including 
a right to enter the property to assure that the designated buffer area is only 
being used in a manner that maximizes the protection of ecological val-
ues.154 The owner of the underlying estate may retain some passive use 
rights, such as the right to pass over the buffer, but is generally proscribed 
from any additional development or use of the property that could disturb 
vegetation in the buffer.155 The purpose behind the designation of a buffer 
                                                 
149 Id. 
150 The actual functions provided by a parcel of property will vary greatly based on a number of 
site-specific conditions such as soil type, slope, vegetation density and type, neighboring land uses, 
etc. 
See, e.g., Alan Desbonnet et al., Development of Coastal Vegetated Buffer Programs, 23 Coastal 
Management 91, 93-95 (1995). 
151 See, e.g., Swinomish, 161 Wash.2d at 430-31. 
152 See, e.g., San Juan County Code (SJCC) § 18.35.150, Table 3.6 (establishing mandatory buff-
ers); SJCC § 18.35.100(D)-(E) (requiring that permit applicants dedicate the buffer by designating it 
and recording it on a site plan or plat). 
153 See also Isla Verde Int’l Holdings, Inc. v. City of Camas, 146 Wash.2d 740, 758-59, 49 P.3d 
867 (2002) (a code provision requiring “reservation of open space” as a condition of permit approval 
is the equivalent of a dedication); Citizens’ All. for Prop. Rights v. Sims, 145 Wash.App 649, 661, 187 
P.3d 786 (2008) (a code provision that prohibited rural property owners from clearing vegetation re-
tention areas as a condition of permit approval constituted a dedication and was subject to nexus and 
proportionality requirements). 
154 See, e.g., City of Bainbridge Island Shoreline Master Program at § 7.2.1 (citing Bainbridge 
Island Municipal Code § 1.16) (available at http://www.bainbridgewa.gov/Docu-
mentCenter/View/5072). 
155 Id. at § 4.1.3.7. 
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zone is to provide a mechanism that will permanently protect the desig-
nated land from development and dedicate the land to the sole purpose of 
providing ecological benefits to the environment.   
From a real property perspective, a governmental exertion of control 
over a buffer zone deprives landowners of a valuable interest in real prop-
erty.156 Washington state property law expressly recognizes that a conser-
vation buffer is a valuable interest in real property:  “A development right, 
easement, covenant, restriction, or other right, or any interest less than the 
fee simple, to protect . . . or conserve for open space purposes . . . consti-
tutes and is classified as real property.”157 And, under both Washington 
state property law and federal constitutional law, a public dedication of a 
property interest can be achieved via notice on a binding public document, 
such as a site plan.158   
A requirement that an owner establish and maintain a conservation 
area plainly constitutes a public use of private land.159 Accordingly, the 
U.S. Supreme Court has twice applied the unconstitutional conditions doc-
trine to conservation areas. In Dolan, the Court invalidated the govern-
ment’s demand that a landowner dedicate a stream buffer.160 In Koontz, 
the Court held that a fee imposed in lieu of a conservation easement was 
subject to the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.161 The Washington 
courts have similarly concluded that critical area buffers must satisfy the 
nexus and proportionality requirements of Nollan and Dolan.162  
                                                 
156 John M. Groen and Richard M. Stephens, Takings Law, Lucas, and the Growth Management 
Act, 16 U. Puget Sound L. Rev.1259, 1309 (1993). 
157 64.04.130 Wash. Rev. Code.  
158 See, e.g., Richardson v. Cox, 108 Wash.App 881, 884, 890-91, 26 P.3d 970 (2001); Nollan, 
483 U.S. at 833 n.2; id. at 859 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (dedication achieved via a deed restriction). 
159 Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[T]here is 
little doubt that the preservation of the habitat of an endangered species is for government and third 
party use—the public—which serves a public purpose.”); see also Nw. Louisiana Fish & Game Pres. 
Comm’n v. United States, 446 F.3d 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (a taking may occur when government pol-
icies cause vegetation overgrowth that interferes with property rights). 
160 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 393-94.   
161 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2592. 
162 KAPO, 160 Wash.App at 273 (“Regulations adopted under the GMA that impose conditions 
on development applications must comply with the nexus and rough proportionality tests.”); HEAL, 
96 Wash.App 522, 533 (“[P]olicies and regulations adopted under GMA must comply with nexus and 
rough proportionality limits the United States Supreme Court has placed on governmental authority to 
impose conditions on development applications.”); see also Dunlap v. City of Nooksack, 158 
Wash.App 1016 (2010) (not reported) (holding that application of a critical area buffer to preclude 
reasonable development of a residential zoned lot effected a total regulatory taking requiring payment 
of just compensation).  
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V. LINGLE AND KOONTZ DEMAND THAT WASHINGTON’S SUPREME 
COURT RECOGNIZE THE DOCTRINE OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS 
AND REFORM ITS BODY OF REGULATORY TAKINGS CASE LAW 
 Over the years, the Washington Supreme Court has repeatedly 
held that decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court interpreting the Fifth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution “set[] a minimum floor of protection, 
below which state law may not go.”163 Yet, the Washington State Supreme 
Court has failed to act when faced with a series of appellate decisions 
adopting rules that directly conflict with Nollan, Dolan, Lingle, and 
Koontz (not to mention conflicts with past state precedents). As it currently 
stands, the State’s law of unconstitutional conditions is marred by a sig-
nificant split of authority in regard to two important questions: (1) whether 
legislatively-mandated exactions are subject to the doctrine; and (2) what 
is the proper standard of review? 
A. There Is No Meaningful Distinction Between A Permit Condition Im-
posed Pursuant to Legislative Direction and One Imposed in an Adjudi-
cative Proceeding 
 Prior to CSA, Washington courts had uniformly held legislatively 
mandated exactions of real property subject to Nollan and Dolan.164 With-
out acknowledging that large body of case law, the CSA court concluded 
that legislative exactions are exempt from heightened scrutiny based 
solely on Justice Kagan’s dissent in Koontz and a passage from Del Monte 
Dunes, reading: 
We have not extended the rough-proportionality test of Dolan beyond 
the special context of exactions—land-use decisions conditioning ap-
proval of development on the dedication of property to public use.165 
In reaching that conclusion, however, the CSA Court failed to 
acknowledge that at least four other appellate decisions had rejected CSA’s 
conclusion, concluding that the particular passage from Del Monte Dunes 
was dicta and intended only to summarize the posture of past decisions 
(which had involved adjudicative land-use decisions).166 
                                                 
163 Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash.2d 621, 652, 747 P.2d 1062 (1987). 
164 See, e.g., KAPO, 160 Wash.App at 273 (“Regulations adopted under the GMA that impose 
conditions on development applications must comply with the nexus and rough proportionality 
tests.”); HEAL, 96 Wash.App at 533 (“[P]olicies and regulations adopted under GMA must comply 
with nexus and rough proportionality limits the United States Supreme Court has placed on govern-
mental authority to impose conditions on development applications”). 
165 Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 702. 
166 See, e.g., HEAL, 96 Wash.App at 534 (rejected supposed limitation as non-binding dicta); 
Benchmark Land Co. v. City of Battle Ground, 103 Wash.App 721, 723-28 (2000) (rejected because 
Supreme Court has in fact extended exactions beyond the definition in Del Monte Dunes); affirmed 
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There is simply no basis in the U.S. Supreme Court’s unconstitutional 
conditions case law to conclude that conditions imposed pursuant to an act 
of generally applicable legislation are exempt from the nexus and propor-
tionality requirements. Indeed, in practice, it is often hard to differentiate 
one from the other. 167 Although courts like CSA frequently state that Nol-
lan, Dolan, and Koontz involved only conditions imposed as part of an 
adjudicative process, that conclusion is incorrect. All three U.S. Supreme 
Court cases involved conditions mandated by general legislation—a fact 
specifically noted in each of the opinions. The dedication of the Nollans’ 
beachfront, for example, was required by a state law requiring that coastal 
property owners provide public access to the beach as a condition on all 
new development permits.168 Both the bike path and greenway dedications 
at issue in Dolan were mandated by the city’s community planning 
code.169 And the in-lieu fee at issue in Koontz was required by a state stat-
ute demanding that owners of land within designated areas dedicate land 
or money to offset presumed impacts to wetlands and their buffers.170  
Indeed, Koontz is illustrative of the interplay between the legislature 
and the permitting desk.171  Acting pursuant to state water protection laws, 
and nearly a decade before Koontz submitted his permit applications, Flor-
ida’s Department of Environmental Protection adopted regulations that 
placed mandatory conditions on any property owner seeking to develop 
land within designated wetland areas.172 The regulations required all local 
permitting authorities to determine the size of the required dedication of 
                                                 
on other grounds, 146 Wash.2d 685 (2002); Isla Verde, 146 Wash.2d at 757-58; Isla Verde, 99 
Wash.App at 138.   
167 Steven A. Haskins, Closing the Dolan Deal—Bridging the Legislative/Adjudicative Divide, 
38 Urb. Law. 487, 514 (2006) (describing the difficulty in drawing a line between legislative and 
administrative decision making in the land-use context). 
168 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828-30 (California Coastal Act and California Public Residential Code 
imposed public access conditions on all coastal development permits); see also id. at 858 (Brennan, 
J., dissenting) (Pursuant to the California Coastal Act of 1972, a deed restriction granting the public 
an easement for lateral beach access “had been imposed [by the Commission] since 1979 on all 43 
shoreline new development projects in the Faria Family Beach Tract”).   
169 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 377-78 (The city’s development code “requires that new development 
facilitate this plan by dedicating land for pedestrian pathways”); id. at 379-80 (“The City Planning 
Commission . . . granted petitioner’s permit application subject to conditions imposed by the city’s 
[Community Development Code]”).   
170 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2592 (Florida’s Water Resources Act of 1972 and Wetland Protection 
Act of 1984 require that permitting agencies impose conditions on any development proposal within 
designated wetlands). 
171 Id. at 2592-93. 
172 Id. 
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land pursuant to a preset and generally-applicable mitigation ratio sched-
ule.173 The condition at issue in Koontz was set by the district pursuant to 
that schedule.174 The fact that the fee was legislatively required did not 
deter the Court from concluding that it was subject to the nexus and pro-
portionality tests175—a fact that compelled Justice Kagan, writing in dis-
sent, to question whether the majority had rejected the legislative-versus-
adjudicative distinction.176   
Whether or not Koontz rejected the legislative-versus-adjudicative 
distinction is ultimately an irrelevant question because Nollan and Dolan 
are rooted in the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine, which “does not dis-
tinguish, in theory or in practice, between conditions imposed by different 
branches of government.”177 The U.S. Supreme Court has frequently relied 
on the doctrine to invalidate legislative acts that impose unconstitutional 
conditions on individuals.178 Indeed, the very purpose of the doctrine—to 
enforce a constitutional limit on government authority—explains why it 
applies without regard to the type of government entity making the uncon-
stitutional demand:  it constrains the state itself, not a subordinate branch 
thereof. 
[T]he power of the state [ . . . ] is not unlimited; and one of the limi-
tations is that it may not impose conditions which require relinquish-
ment of constitutional rights.  If the state may compel the surrender 
of one constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it may, compel 
                                                 
173 Id.; see also Respondent’s Brief in Opposition at 5 n.4, Koontz, 133 S.Ct. 2586 (2012) (No. 
11–1447), 2012 WL 3142655, at *5 n.4 (citing Fla. Dep't of Env. Reg., Policy for "Wetlands Preser-
vation-as-Mitigation" (June 20, 1988)). 
174 Brief for Respondent at 11-12, Koontz, 133 S.Ct. 2586 (2012) (No. 11–1447), 2012 WL 
6694053. 
175 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2599-2600. 
176 Id. at 2608 (Kagan, J., dissenting); see also Levin v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 71 F. Supp. 
3d 1072, 1083, n.4 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (concluding that Koontz undermines the reasoning for holding 
legislative exactions exempt from scrutiny under Nollan and Dolan). 
177 Burling & Owen, 28 Stan. Envtl. L.J. at, 400.   
178 See Lafayette Ins. Co v. French, 59 U.S. 404, 407,  (1855) (Invalidating provisions of state 
law conditioning permission for a foreign company to do business in Ohio upon the waiver of the right 
to litigate disputes in the U.S. Federal District Courts because “This consent [to do business as a for-
eign corporation] may be accompanied by such condition as Ohio may think fit to impose; . . . provided 
they are not repugnant to the constitution of laws of the United States.”); see also Marshall v. Barlow’s 
Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 315 (1978) (invalidating provisions of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 
holding that a business owner could not be compelled to choose between a warrantless search of his 
business by a government agent or shutting down the business); Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 
418 U.S. 241, 255 (1974) (holding a state statute unconstitutional as an abridgement of freedom of the 
press because it forced a newspaper to incur additional costs by adding more material to an issue or 
remove material it desired to print); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963) (provisions of un-
employment compensation statute held unconstitutional where government required person to “violate 
a cardinal principle of her religious faith” in order to receive benefits); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 
513, 528-29 (1958) (a state constitutional provision authorizing the government to deny a tax exemp-
tion for applicants’ refusal to take loyalty oath violated unconstitutional conditions doctrine). 
28 Seattle Journal of Environmental Law [Vol. 8:1 
a surrender of all.  It is inconceivable that guarantees embedded in 
the Constitution of the United States may thus be manipulated out of 
existence.179   
“Giving greater leeway to conditions imposed by the legislative 
branch is inconsistent with the theoretical justifications for the doctrine 
because those justifications are concerned with questions of the exercise 
[of] government power and not the specific source of that power.”180 A 
property owner, after all, suffers the same injury whether a legislative or 
administrative body forces him to bargain away his rights in exchange for 
a land-use permit. There is “little doctrinal basis beyond blind deference 
to legislative decisions to limit [the] application of [Nollan or Dolan] only 
to administrative or quasi-judicial acts of government regulators.”181  
Although Justice Kagan noted uncertainty regarding this question, 
two Justices have expressed marked skepticism at the very idea that the 
need for heightened scrutiny is obviated when a legislative body—as op-
posed to some other government entity—decides to exact a property inter-
est from developers. In Parking Ass’n of Georgia, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 
Ga., the Atlanta City Council, motivated by a desire to beautify the down-
town area, adopted an ordinance that required the owners of parking lots 
to include landscaped areas equal to at least 10% of the paved area at an 
estimated cost of $12,500 per lot.182 Despite an apparent lack of propor-
tionality, Georgia’s Supreme Court upheld the ordinance, concluding that 
legislatively-imposed exactions are not subject to Nollan and Dolan.183 
The dissenting justices stated that there appeared to be no meaningful dis-
tinction between legislatively-imposed conditions and other exactions.184  
                                                 
179 Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm’n, 271 U.S. 583, 593-94 (1926) (invalidating 
state law that required trucking company to dedicate personal property to public uses as a condition 
for permission to use highways). See also Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535, 543 (1876) 
(Bradley, J., dissenting) (“Though a State may have the power, if it sees fit to subject its citizens to 
the inconvenience, of prohibiting all foreign corporations from transacting business within its juris-
diction, it has no power to impose unconstitutional conditions upon their doing so.”);  Richard A. 
Epstein, Bargaining with the State 5 (1993) (The doctrine holds that even if the government has abso-
lute discretion to grant or deny any individual a privilege or benefit—such as a land-use permit, “it 
cannot grant the privilege subject to conditions that improperly ‘coerce,’ ‘pressure,’ or ‘induce’ the 
waiver of that person’s constitutional rights”). 
180 Burling at 438. 
181 David L. Callies, Regulatory Takings and the Supreme Court:  How Perspectives on Property 
Rights Have Changed from Penn Central to Dolan, and What State and Federal Courts Are Doing 
About It, 28 Stetson L. Rev. 523, 567-68 (1999).   
182 515 U.S. 1116, 1116 (1995) (Thomas, J., joined by O’Connor, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari). 
183 Id. at 1117.   
184 Id. at 1117-18 (“It is not clear why the existence of a taking should turn on the type of gov-
ernment entity responsible for the taking. A city council can take property just as well as a planning 
commission can”). 
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Both justices argued that the question warrants review because it 
raises a substantial question of federal constitutional law.185   
Justice Thomas reaffirmed that position in his concurring opinion in 
support of the Court’s denial of certiorari in California Bldg. Indus. Ass’n 
v. City of San Jose.186 There, he wrote that the “lower courts have divided 
over whether the Nollan/Dolan test applies in cases where the alleged tak-
ing arises from a legislatively imposed condition rather than an adminis-
trative one” for at least two decades.187 Once again, he expressed “doubt 
that ‘the existence of a taking should turn on the type of governmental 
entity responsible for the taking.’”188 Justice Thomas further noted that this 
issue must be decided “at the earliest practicable opportunity.”189 Until 
then, “property owners and local governments are left uncertain about 
what legal standard governs legislative ordinances and whether cities can 
legislatively impose exactions that would not pass muster if done admin-
istratively.” These factors present compelling reasons for resolving this 
conflict at the earliest practicable opportunity.190 Those same policy con-
cerns demand a resolution to this patent conflict in Washington’s uncon-
stitutional conditions case law. 
B. Only Heightened Scrutiny Enshrined in the Nexus and Proportionality 
Tests Will Protect Both the Government’s Authority to Require Permit 
Applicants to Mitigate for Negative Externalities and the Owners’ Prop-
erty Rights  
The heightened scrutiny required by Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz is 
essential to the integrity of the permitting process. Typically, a permit de-
cision will include conditions designed to minimize and/or mitigate ad-
verse impacts caused by a new development. If limited to the impacts of 
the proposed development, those conditions are likely within the govern-
ment’s land use authority, which includes the power to direct development 
in a manner that promotes communities and avoids nuisance or waste.191  
But government officials by their very nature are politically motivated and, 
if allowed unrestricted land use authority, will use the permit process to 
                                                 
185 Id. at 1118. 
186 136 S. Ct. 928, 928 (2016) (Thomas, J. concurring in denial of certiorari).   
187 Id. at 929.   
188 Id. (citing Parking Ass’n of Georgia, 515 U.S. at 1117-18). 
189 Id. 
190 Id.; see also Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2608 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (The fact that this Court has 
not yet resolved the split of authority on this question “casts a cloud on every decision by every local 
government to require a person seeking a permit to pay or spend money”).  
191 See Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928); Village of Euclid v. Ambler 
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926); Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136-37 (1894). 
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advance policies that may be unrelated to the proposed development.192 In 
this regard, Professor Mark W. Cordes notes that Nollan and Dolan were 
intended to curtail “the common municipal practice of using the develop-
ment exaction process as a means to capture already targeted tracts of land 
without paying just compensation[.]”193   
The test created by KAPO, OSF, and CSA cannot distinguish an im-
proper, politically-motivated permit condition from a proper condition 
seeking to mitigate or minimize a harmful externality. Those decisions fo-
cus solely on whether the development condition is “reasonably necessary 
to achieve a legitimate government objective.”194 When the test is formu-
lated that way, the government’s ability to demand land for politically-
motivated purposes is only limited by an official’s imagination. So, it was 
not surprising that in the three decisions applying that standard, the courts 
upheld a condition that required owners to dedicate a predetermined 
amount of waterfront property as a conservation buffer based solely on the 
government’s argument that converting residential lots to nature preserves 
would advance its environmental restoration and enhancement goals.195 In 
none of the cases was the county required to show that the dedication of a 
conservation area was in any way necessary to minimize or mitigate for 
impacts caused by a proposed use of the burdened lots.196 
Because the KAPO court based its decisions on the wrong constitu-
tional provision, the due process rather than the takings clause, it is unsur-
prising that the rule focuses on a substantively different question than that 
answered by Nollan and Dolan. KAPO, OSF, and CSA ask only whether 
the government relied on a scientific document to determine “the necessity 
of protecting functions and values in the critical areas,” i.e., the alleged 
public need.197 By contrast, the Nollan and Dolan tests require that gov-
ernments justify an exaction by demonstrating a sufficient relationship be-
tween the development condition and the impact caused by the proposed 
development.198 In this regard, Koontz clarified that the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine “does not implicate normative considerations about 
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the wisdom of government decisions,” nor does it posit whether the exac-
tion is “arbitrary or unfair.”199 Instead, the court’s task is to determine 
whether a permit condition bears the “required degree of connection be-
tween the exactions imposed by the [government] and the projected im-
pacts” of the property owner’s proposed change in land use.200   
The U.S. Supreme Court explained this important distinction in 
Lingle, when it rejected the “substantially advances a legitimate govern-
ment interest” test as a takings test, because it “reveal[ed] nothing about 
the magnitude or character of the burden a particular regulation imposes 
upon private property rights.”201 “A test that tells us nothing about the ac-
tual burden imposed on property rights, or how that burden is allocated, 
cannot tell us when justice might require that the burden be spread among 
taxpayers through payment of compensation.”202 In the context of the tak-
ings clause, a determination that a regulation serves a public need, without 
more, is not sufficient to justify a regulation that appropriates property for 
a public use.203   
Because the Washington rule cannot distinguish legitimate condi-
tions from illegitimate demands, the rule threatens to undermine the anti-
coercion underpinnings of the nexus and proportionality tests.204 By des-
ignating public need as the sole determinative factor when an exaction is 
challenged, the Washington rule endorses the very type of opportunistic 
taking of property that the U.S. Supreme Court expressly disallowed in 
Nollan and Dolan. In Dolan, the Court explained that nexus and propor-
tionality analysis is necessary to determine whether a development condi-
tion is “‘merely being used as an excuse for taking property simply be-
cause at that particular moment the landowner is asking the city for some 
license or permit.’”205 Without meaningful scrutiny, it is impossible for a 
court to determine whether there is a sufficient relationship between the 
exaction and the development impact, making it possible that the demand 
“would be fortuitous, since the type and extent of the exaction is deter-
mined by the preexisting determination of the plan rather than the impact 
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of the development.”206 Thus, the analysis required by Nollan and Dolan 
is especially important where the government seeks to exact benefits re-
lating to popular policy goals, such as environmentalism.207   
C. The Ordinary Deference Given to General Legislative Acts Cannot 
Protect Against Unconstitutional Conditions and Cannot Replace the 
Heightened Scrutiny Required by Nollan and Dolan 
The most common argument in favor of excluding legislative de-
mands for money and/or property from Nollan and Dolan—deference to 
the Legislature208—demonstrates precisely why heightened scrutiny is 
necessary. Typically, when reviewing a challenge to an act of legislation, 
courts will defer to the will of the people because generally-applicable 
laws are subject to the democratic process, which operates as a check on 
legislative authority.209 However, that justification fails in the context of 
exactions, because the Takings Clause is founded on the anti-majoritarian 
principle that “public burdens ... should be borne by the public as a whole” 
and cannot be shifted onto individual property owners.210 When the gov-
ernment places public costs on a small number of people, the democratic 
process, which is majoritarian in nature, works as an endorsement, not a 
check.211 In that circumstance, “it [is] entirely possible that the government 
could ‘gang up’ on particular groups to force extractions that a majority of 
constituents would not only tolerate, but applaud, so long as burdens they 
would otherwise bear were shifted to others.”212   
That is precisely what occurred in each of the state cases where the 
courts refused to subject buffer exactions to heightened scrutiny. In KAPO, 
the court upheld a dedication of a 100-foot conservation buffer where the 
county admitted in the record that the mandatory dedication was not re-
lated to any identified impacts of shoreline development—instead, the 
county wanted to impose buffers that were larger than necessary to pre-
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serve private shorelines until such a time as the county could do the nec-
essary studies to learn what impacts could occur if the land was devel-
oped.213   
Similarly, in CSA, San Juan County decided to address its general 
water quality concerns by adopting an ordinance requiring individual land-
owners to dedicate buffers designed to filter pollutants from area runoff.214  
The County did this despite the fact that itsstudies had concluded that a 
significant amount of the pollutants originate from upland properties, in-
cluding runoff from public roads.215 There is no question that the County 
could have implemented its policy by condemning land or existing build-
ings for a public use.216 Instead, the County made its demand in the form 
of a permit condition, circumventing the just compensation requirement.   
These cases demonstrate that, without a requirement that the govern-
ment prove a sufficient connection between a legislative exaction and the 
project impacts, there is no limit to the amount of money or property that 
the government can demand as a permit condition, and there is no end to 
the types of social problems that the government can burden an individual 
permit applicant with. In this regard, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeat-
edly cautioned that “[i]f . . . the uses of private property were subject to 
unbridled, uncompensated qualification under the police power, the ‘nat-
ural tendency of human nature [would be] to extend the qualification more 
and more until at last private property disappeared.’”217 Thus, a rule re-
quiring only that the government show that a buffer will advance its inter-
est in protecting the environment cannot address the protections guaran-
teed by the Takings Clause and cannot supplant the wisdom and balance 
written into the nexus and proportionality tests. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 Washington’s current rule encourages the very type of govern-
ment abuse of the permitting process that Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz in-
tended to stop. In its current state, Washington case law violates two of the 
most basic principles of takings law. First, that “a strong public desire to 
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improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving that desire 
by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change.”218   
Second, that “public burdens ... should be borne by the public as a whole” 
and cannot be shifted onto individual property owners.219 Resolution of 
this constitutional conflict is a matter of utmost importance to private and 
public interests, which both rely on predictability in the law in order to 
plan for future development. It is also a matter of extreme importance to 
environmental interests because local governments are myopically relying 
on private buffer dedications as the primary tool to mitigate for develop-
ment impacts, thereby exposing the government to significant liability 
should the legal tactic fail.   
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